Iran’s significant nuclear progress and a shift in global politics have eroded the foundations of the 2015 JCPOA accord, and made a new deal much less attainable.

This article consists of two parts: The first part deals with the political implications of the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the second part with the technical status of the nuclear program (NP) of the IRI and how they match or contradict the provisions of the nuclear accord JCPOA.

Part 1

Political implications

After the US withdrew from the nuclear agreement called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018 by then-president Donald Trump, the Islamic government under former President Hassan Rouhani waited another year before taking countermeasures. It most likely hesitated because the conclusion of the JCPOA had been a key achievement for Hassan Rouhani's presidency; it did not want to give it up easily.

With the imminent change of administrations in the US, and Joe Biden’s announcement of his intention to return to the JCPOA, the hardliners in Tehran passed a parliamentary bill in December 2020 called "strategic measures to lift sanctions and protect the rights of the Iranian nation", which forced Rouhani’s government to take countermeasures. The December 2020 legislation ordered a gradual rollback of the IRI's JCPOA commitments. It required the government:

1. Annual production of 120 kg Uranium with 20% enrichment grade and higher;
2. The enrichment capacity to be increased to 190000 SWU (Separation Work Unit) with at least 500 kg of enriched uranium per month;
3. Centrifuges of the advanced generations to be put into operation;
4. To start producing metallic Uranium in Esfahan (Isfahan);
5. To push ahead with the construction of the 40 MW heavy water reactor at Arak ;
6. To stop the application of the Additional Protocol (AD) to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT);
7. To prosecute those in the government who do not comply with this legislation.

There are many signs indicating that the regime has seen Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA as a favorable opportunity to accelerate the nuclear program (NP) (essentially Uranium enrichment) with an ambivalent intention: to move closer to the nuclear bomb in order to make it if feasible: either by a spontaneous decision or at a favorable opportunity; or merely to use it as a means of threatening or even blackmailing the West.

Tehran seemed determined to demonstrate that it could produce nuclear weapons it was undertaking measures to make it possible.

To emphasize this threatening gesture, high-ranking dignitaries of the regime, namely Kamal Kharrazi, the former foreign minister and current advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, along with other high-ranking officials, have pointed out that the regime would be able to build a nuclear bomb if it only wanted to, only that that Islam prohibits weapons of mass destruction.

To implement parliamentary legislation, Tehran found itself in violation of the provisions of the JCPOA. The claimed legal basis for this action was clause 26 of the JCPOA, which allows parties to take countermeasures; however, this provision is restricted by clause 37 of the JCPOA. Clause 37 involves an arbitration mechanism that may eventually bring a dispute before the UN Security Council, potentially leading to the 'snap-back' scenario. This implies that all sanctions against the IRI imposed by the UN Security Council prior to the conclusion of the JCPOA, which were merely suspended (not lifted), could be reinstated.

Tehran believed that the West was neither willing nor able to initiate a military conflict in the Middle East. This encouraged the regime not only to disregard the provisions of the JCPOA but also to rapidly advance beyond it, aiming to become a so-called 'threshold' nuclear power.

Meanwhile, soon after Biden took office, multilateral negotiations began in Vienna in April 2021 to revive the JCPOA. The talks were said to have been moving in the right direction when presidential elections took place in Iran in June.

The newly elected administration of Ebrahim Raisi rejected the preliminary agreements reached by the Rouhani government with the 4+1 powers (China, Russia, France, UK, and Germany under the leadership of the EU) plus the US as an indirect negotiating party. The new administration only began negotiations after a pause of around 6 months.

Meanwhile, the regime initiated higher-level uranium enrichment pursuant to the parliamentary bill, enhancing its nuclear threat potential and boosting its self-confidence. However, given the dire economic conditions in Iran, exacerbated by US sanctions, Tehran likely found itself compelled to return to the negotiating table. Nevertheless, its envoys, some of whom had been staunch opponents of the JCPOA, arrived with high, at times unrealistic expectations. These expectations encompassed three primary aspects: the verifiable lifting of economic sanctions, the removal of sanctions related to individuals or institutions due to human rights violations or support for terrorism, and a long-term guarantee of future US presidents' commitment to the agreement.

From the outset, the Biden administration expressed its willingness to revitalize the JCPOA while also aiming to address Iran's regional policies and ballistic missile program in the negotiations. These later concerns were dropped and postponed.

Demands from the IRI, such as removing the Revolutionary Guard from the US terrorist list and ensuring overarching compliance with agreements by future administrations, could not be accepted by Washington.

Nevertheless, negotiations appeared to be progressing well, and an agreement seemed within reach when Russia initiated its military assault on Ukraine in February 2020. Russia's foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, exploited Western sanctions against his country as a pretext to disrupt the conclusion of an agreement. The IRI might have ignored Russia's objections if it were not politically and militarily complicit with Russia in supporting the aggression against Ukraine.

Subsequently, a period of relative diplomatic inactivity ensued, lasting until August. Meanwhile, the IRI made determined efforts to accelerate the advancement of its enrichment program.

The nationwide Women-Life-Freedom uprising of Iranian citizens following the violent death of Mahsa Jina Amini shook the foundations of the Islamic regime, causing irreparable damage to its legitimacy among a vast majority of Iranian citizens. The government's violent and sometimes brutal response to the protests deeply angered Iranians. Furthermore, inefficiency, corruption, and mismanagement were eroding the regime's legitimacy.

Due to the global support for the Women-Life-Freedom movement, particularly in democratic Western countries, the Islamic regime's legitimacy suffered internationally as well. These pressures created cracks in the regime's power structures. To prevent these cracks from deepening, it became imperative to seek legitimacy abroad. The regime needed to demonstrate, especially to its own supporters, that it was still accepted as a partner in the West. The most effective way to achieve this goal was to enhance its nuclear threat potential to intimidate the West into entering negotiations.

From the IRI viewpoint negotiations with representatives of the major powers of the UN Security Council (UNSC) on a public stage would be an ideal vehicle for restoring its lost legitimacy abroad.

No surprise that the regime was suddenly prone to drop pretty much all the demands it had made before the negotiations were suspended. After some sporadic contacts with the EU foreign policy envoys, they finally succeeded in reaching their milestone goal -legitimacy and cash, first in secret talks and later in open indirect talks with the USA in Oman.

Meanwhile, the tremendous advancement of the Tehran’s nuclear program has almost eliminated the basis for a similar accord like JCPOA. Therefore, as a minimum consensus the parties reduced their expectations: For the West it was apparently sufficient to de-escalate if the IRI would freeze the stockpile of LEU and for Teheran to get access to world arena including the West and some urgently needed cash. Tacitly, both sides reached an agreement on release of Western citizens - mostly dual nationals who have in fact been taken as hostages -in exchange for granting legitimacy and money to the Islamic regime as well as freeing their own terrorists or sanction-breakers convicted by Western courts.
Among other things, the build-up of a nuclear threat on the part of the IRI has prompted Western governments to return to their notorious policy of appeasement towards the IRI. This behavior of the western countries legalizes de facto the hostage-taking policy of the IRI.

Part Two: The State of the IRI Nuclear Program

After the parliament's decision in 2020, taking the path of nuclear threats - the regime undertook the following measures:

1. December 2020: Legislation of the parliament
2. Announcement of the start of production of 20% uranium in Fordo, whereby this production site represents a higher threat potential because it is buried deep in the mountain with a relative invulnerability.
   In addition, the production of metallic uranium was announced, which is essential for the manufacturing of a nuclear explosive,
3. February 2021: termination of the voluntary commitment to the Additional Protocol agreed under the JCPOA.
4. In a letter dated February 15, 2021, Iran informed the IAEA that the IRI will stop "the implementation of voluntary transparency measures as provided for in the JCPOA as of February 23, 2021". These stops concern in detail:

1. Provisions of the Additional Protocol (AP) to the CSA (Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement). This allows the IAEA to carry out unannounced inspections not only at already declared nuclear facilities, but also at undeclared sites.
2. Modified Code 3.1 of the Supplementary Agreements to the CSA, which regulates when a state must declare a nuclear project to the IAEA;
3. Use of modern technologies, i.e. ban on the use of the more advanced generations of centrifuges beyond the approx. 5000 IR1 (first centrifuge generation);
4. Transparency measures in relation to Uranium ore concentrate (UOC). Under the JCPOA, IRI had committed that IRI's exploitation works at Uranium mines and the production of the so-called yellow cake to be monitored by the IAEA for 25 years;
5. Transparency measures related to enrichment, i.e. monitoring and control of the amount of enriched Uranium and its degree of enrichment on-line.
6. Access in accordance with the provisions of the JCPOA; i.e. long-term presence of IAEA inspectors and the possibility of intensive inspections
7. Monitoring and reviewing the implementation of voluntary measures.
8. Transparency measures in connection with the manufacturing of centrifuge components

The practical consequences of the IRI decisions and the resulting current situation of its nuclear program are explained below.

Commitments to the NPT and CSA vis-à-vis the IAEA

Undeclared nuclear facilities and activities:

Over the past 5 years, the IRI has not properly answered questions regarding four undeclared sites and suspected nuclear activities prior to 2003 where traces of anthropogenic uranium particles and other activities have been detected. The problem has been solved for two sites for the time being, but the sites Torqouzabad and Varamin have not yet been resolved.

Some of the questions are going back to the undeclared locations where nuclear activities had presumably taken place around 20 years ago. But in these sites the buildings and many other traces had since been removed. It is suspected that the IRI had conducted experiments to develop a nuclear weapon in these sites. In my view, the reason why these past issues have gained actuality is the conduct of the IRI. The unleashing of enrichment up to the threshold of weapons-grade Uranium gives rise to concerns among the involved institutions and countries. They would like to know how far the IRI nuclear program had previously progressed towards bomb-making beyond enrichment.

Reduction in transparency:

Following the official termination of the Additional Protocol to the NPT application in February 2021, IRI has gradually reduced its obligations under the NPT CSA: These are non-compliance with the requirements of modified Code C3.1 of the Supplementary Agreement to the CSA. The original text C3.1 stated that countries are obliged to notify the IAEA 180 days prior to the introduction of nuclear materials into their nuclear facilities. But the modified Code C3.1 states that countries must notify the IAEA immediately when they start planning a nuclear project. The IRI has nevertheless applied this code for some time. However, the IRI pairs it with the JCPOA and now that it no longer feels bound by the JCPOA, it does not want to observe the provisions of the Code C3.1 either - but it tacitly applies these provisions in practice. In short, there are divergent legal interpretations by the IAEA and the IRI in this case.

Another step the IRI has taken against transparency is the obstruction of inspectors. It recently culminated in the denial of visas to several particularly competent IAEA experts from Western countries. This was condemned in unusually harsh terms by IAEA director Rafael Grossi in his November 2023 report.

He is concerned that, under these circumstances, the transparency of the IRI's nuclear activities could be severely compromised. This may be the reason for his recent warning that the IRI could follow a similar path few years ago paved by North Korea. This language of the IAEA is completely new and reflects that concern.

Another point of contention between the IAEA and IRI is the discrepancy in the inventory of nuclear material at the UCF Isfahan plant.

In Connection with JCPOA

Shortly after the mentioned parliamentary legislation, the IRI in February 2021 terminated its observance of the following obligations:

Transparency measures in connection with enrichment

JCPOA requires that the Uranium235 enrichment level may not exceed 3.67 percent and that the maximum amount to be accumulated in Iran shall not exceed 300kg UF6.

The IRI has gradually increased this limit to 5, 20 and 60 percent. The total mass of enriched Uranium amounts to 4486.8 kg UF6, which is nominally 15 times the permitted amount (although the calculation is not that straightforward). Some experts wrongly report the factor 22, which is usually reflected uncritically by the media.

But what can be regarded as particularly menacing is the accumulated quantity of 60-percent enriched uranium (HEU Highly Enriched Uranium). It amounts to 128.3 kg UF6.

Further enrichment to 90 percent can take place within a few weeks, so that the regime could possess enough material for at least two nuclear bombs - at this point it is worth noting that the IRI still has a long way to go before getting a nuclear explosive device; enough HEU does not immediately make a bomb.

In the wake of a relative détente with the US and rapprochement with its Arab allies in the Persian Gulf, the IRI slowed down its production of HEU in 2023. The following diagram of the history of HEU production shows how de-escalation occurred in 2023, in line with the regime's intentions I mentioned above.

However, according to a December 2023 IAEA report, the IRI has reversed this de-escalation. Probably, due to the change of the political landscape in the Middle East following the outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas the IRI has triplet the production of LEU and reached 9 kg per month. It is difficult to determine whether this reversal is a reprisal for some additional sanctions recently imposed by the US, or the IRI will elevate its nuclear threat by accelerating the enrichment because it anticipates growing tensions between Israel and the Hezbollah.

Production of metallic Uranium:

The production of a nuclear warhead requires HEU % 90 in metallic form; Thus, the work in this field was prohibited under the JCPOA provisions. However, as described above, the regime has begun converting UF6 into metallic uranium at the Isfahan plant to reinforce its implicit threat.

Number and quality of centrifuges:

Centrifuges are machines that are used to produce higher concentration of Uranium235 out of natural uranium with a Uranium135 content of 0.7 percent. They work serially and are organized in groups called cascades. This requires uranium in gaseous form provided by Uranium hexafluoride (UF6).

In the framework of the JCPOA IRI committed to following provisions:
To entertain just over 5000 first generation (IR 1) centrifuges in operation (approx. 30 cascades). Research and development in the field of centrifuge technology was permitted but only in small numbers and not for production purposes.

Following the December 2020 legislation, Tehran began to produce, install and operate not only far more IR1, but also IR2, IR 2m, IR4, IR6 and beyond. The enrichment capability of the higher generations is 4 to 10 times higher than IR1, depending on the generation. The number of installed cascades amounts to 77 and those in operation to 62, which means that IRI currently has approx. 12,000 centrifuges, of which approx. 10,000 are in operation - and the trend is rising.

Uranium exploitation from Iranian mines

An important goal of the JCPOA was the complete transparency of the IRI nuclear program from uranium mining to disposal, so that the targeted breakout time of at least one year was guaranteed. The IAEA was therefore authorized to monitor uranium ore production activities for 25 years. During Tehran's countermeasures, this authorization was withdrawn from the IAEA. This means that the IAEA can no longer estimate how much uranium flows into the IRI's nuclear program.

Reduction of transparency during enrichment

The IRI refuses to provide the IAEA with online access to surveillance data in enrichment and other facilities. Instead, the IRI agreed to continue to store this data and to make it available to the IAEA only after a possible renewal of the JCPOA.
Later, maintenance of the monitoring equipment -- cameras, inline sensors, etc. -- was delayed, creating the risk of information gaps.

In June 2022, the 27 JCPOA-related cameras and inline sensors for recording the enrichment level were deactivated. However, the cameras that were installed in accordance with the CSA were retained. A similar procedure was followed regarding the cameras installed to monitor the production of centrifuge components. Here again, the IRI permitted the partial use of both cameras and inline sensors as part of its CSA obligations.

Inspection regulations

Under the Additional Protocol to the NPT, the IRI shall allow, beside the declared sites and facilities, inspection of undeclared sites as well as unannounced but managed inspections. By renouncing this commitment, Tehran has significantly reduced the transparency of its nuclear program.

Therefore, the IAEA complains that, firstly: seamless monitoring of the facilities is no longer possible and, secondly: if the amount of data generated becomes too large, it will be very difficult to reconstruct what has happened.

Furthermore, Rafael Grossi explicitly warns that the IAEA is no longer able to restore the continuity and integrity of knowledge in the following parts: The production and storage of centrifuges and their components, heavy water and uranium ore extraction.

These warnings have been accompanied, for the first time, by new language from the IAEA indicating concerns that the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) could follow a similar path to North Korea. This expression of uncertainty reflects the opaque behavior of the IRI in its interactions with the IAEA.

Conclusion: The prospect of revival of the JCPOA

A pre-requisite for JCPOA was to ensure a one-year break-out time for Iran. It is defined as the time required until a country succeeds to possess sufficient weapons-grade HEU for one nuclear weapon.

Many parameters that determine this breakout time have now been fundamentally changed: The IRI is only a few weeks away from it, the technology is well developed and a whole lot of know how has been acquired.

Even if IRI were prepared to eliminate all modern centrifuges and other hardware, the technological experience and know-how would remain. A return to the situation before the 2015 JCPOA is no longer feasible. In addition, the political constellation has changed dramatically. A decade ago, there was still some common ground between Russia and China on the one hand and the West on the other. Now, this common ground has vanished and is replaced by rivalries. Moreover, Tehran's support for Russian aggression against Ukraine as well as for Hamas against Israel make it more complicated for the West to reach an agreement with Tehran.

The Iranian regime is caught in a dilemma: delegitimized by the women-life-freedom uprising and under pressure due to the economic crisis it faces, it would perhaps prefer to seek a compromise with the West.

On the other hand, the regime is concerned about the softening of its long-held hostility towards the United States which has mutated into its raison d'être. Moreover, the IRI hardliners have experienced the benefits of practicing the nuclear threat. Are they willing to give up this perceived strength? As Raphael Grossi put it, an entirely new agreement is required.

Given the bloody carnage between Israel and Hamas, it is more likely that the Iranian regime would not give up this "weapon" so easily.

The prospects are not promising for an agreement in foreseeable future in the nuclear dispute between the West and the Islamic Republic of Iran.