Last week, former Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif advocated for diversity in selecting the new cabinet, despite the Islamic Republic's history of repressing dissent and even internal critics.
Appointed to propose a list of candidates for each ministry in newly elected President Masoud Pezeshkian’s administration, Zarif spoke about a kind of affirmative action, in favor of prioritizing youth, women, ethnic groups, and religious minorities in the selection process.
"If the candidate is a man, he does not get points, but if she is a woman, she gets 10 points. Likewise, if you are from other religions, you will get points, and if you are a Shia Muslim, you will not get points here... We want to give points so that we can use other ethnic groups and groups that have less presence in the cabinets, including women and youth," he said.
This criterion faced serious opposition from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's representative in the state-run newspaper Kayhan, as well as from "revolutionary" outlets such as Javan and Hamshahri. Additionally, several Friday prayer worshipers expressed their disapproval, some even resorting to using profanity against Zarif.
However, beyond this opposition, is this type of affirmative action a feasible possibility in the Islamic Republic?
Realities
While Zarif spoke of social diversity in the presidential administration, the Islamic Republic has systematically, and sometimes brutally, eliminated not only opponents of the clerical regime but also its own internal critics. The pool of people eligible for even mid-level positions is limited to a few hundred insiders.
When Zarif talks about diversity, he means allowing a relatively broader range of fully loyal individuals to the clerical system and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to be appointed.
In addition to the ideological and political impediments however, certain groups are subject to systemic discrimination in the ruling system.
In the past 45 years, since the inception of the Islamic Republic, only one woman has served in the cabinet, and this was not even in administrations claiming to be “moderate” or “reformist.” Marzieh Dastjerdi was appointed as the Minister of Health during the second term of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's administration (2009-2013).
Over the past decades, there have been no non-Shia ministers, and few relatively high-level officials.
The ratio of women to men in the Strategic Council for determining Pezeshkian's cabinet candidates (run by Zarif) is 2 to 21, with efforts to increase the representation of women and other minorities. Only one Sunni Kurd was added to this council after a Shia Kurd protested.
Possibilities
Pezeshkian wants to appoint younger people to cabinet positions, a quest which enjoys consensus among political factions in Iran, as the revolutionary generation from the 1970s is aging and there is a need for fresh blood in the system.
Regarding female cabinet members, there is no principled opposition from Khamenei or the factions against Pezeshkian's administration. Opposition from the "Revolutionary Islamic Assembly" loyal to Khamenei would likely be directed at the specific individual proposed, rather than the concept itself.
Historically, a Shia Kurd was promoted to the position of administration spokesperson in Mohammad Khatami's cabinet, but no Sunni Kurd has held such a role.
The Islamic Republic has consistently refused to grant high political and judicial positions to Sunnis due to its official Shia religion. The likelihood of a Sunni Baluch or Kurd joining the cabinet remains very low, as Shia sources of emulation in Qom and Najaf oppose it. This would only change if Khamenei were willing to accept the risk of their opposition, which is highly unlikely.
Subtle risk
Zarif's stance on assigning negative scores to "Shia men" in the cabinet selection process challenges the established norms of the Islamic Republic.
This has resulted in strong reactions to his interview.
Unlike defending his proposed cabinet composition on the grounds of meritocracy—which could potentially appeal to public opinion or at least mitigate opposition—Zarif bases his argument on a policy of discrimination against Shia men.
This approach not only contradicts the traditional limits but also fails to present a compelling rationale that aligns with the broader values and expectations of the political landscape.
Showing off diversity in a discriminatory system
The Islamic Republic is characterized by systemic legal and institutional discrimination against various segments of its population. High judicial and legal authorities, along with the appointment of future leaders, are officially reserved for clerics and jurists. This preference extends even to public school teacher appointments, where clerics are favored over non-clerics.
Women face formal barriers to roles such as the presidency, judgeship, and membership in the army. Non-Shiites are effectively excluded from influential bodies like the Assembly of Experts, the Expediency Council, and most military, security, and diplomatic organizations. Additionally, wealth, power, and status are concentrated among a small group loyal to the Guardian Jurist.
The representation of women in the Islamic Assembly (Majles) has fluctuated between 1% and 6% over its 12 terms. Despite women occupying over 50% of university seats, their employment rate has remained between 11% and 15%. The economic contribution of Iranian women is estimated based on these employment levels.
Even if a female, Kurdish, or Sunni minister were appointed to the cabinet, it would likely serve a symbolic and deceptive purpose in a system where discrimination against women, ethnic and religious minorities, and citizens disloyal to the regime is both functional and structural.
Zarif's actions may deceive Western observers and those adhering to "woke" ideology in their so-called advocacy for social justice, but only a small percentage of Iranian citizens are likely to be convinced by this performative statement.
If the new administration is genuine in its diversification efforts, it should start by appointing Sunni governors for regions like Kurdistan and Sistan-Baluchestan, where Sunni populations are significant.