Despite former Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif's prior announcement that he would not hold a position in the Pezeshkian administration, he was appointed deputy for strategic affairs to the new president.
What is the capacity of this newly created position? What is Zarif's agenda in this context, and what goals will he pursue? Based on what has been said and published in Iran so far, Zarif's most likely role will be to lead influence campaigns in the West.
Deputy, adviser, or head of a study center?
The text of President Masoud Pezeshkian’s appointment letter draws multiple roles for Zarif. As the President’s deputy, Zarif will hold a portfolio equivalent to those overseeing executive, parliamentary, legal, and Sunni affairs, or similar to positions like the heads of the Atomic Energy Organization, the Management and Planning Organization, or the Environmental Protection Organization. While these organizations are not ministries, they function at a comparable level.
At the same time, Zarif is expected to advise the head of the executive branch on strategic matters. His role includes: "Leveraging the accumulated experience of the country's senior managers over the past decades and the extensive expertise of elites from think tanks and civil society institutions.” The president also noted that Zarif is “expected to monitor major domestic and international developments, assess the success in achieving the goals of the constitution, the vision document, and the general policies approved by the Supreme Leader, and report directly to me." Zarif himself acknowledges this advisory role.
Another role assigned to Zarif is to preside over a research institute. According to Pezeshkian’s letter, Zarif is tasked with "taking over the responsibility of the Presidential Strategic Research Center and transforming its missions and functions into a suitable organization for the President’s deputyship." The Presidential Strategic Research Center, part of the Iranian Presidential Institution, serves as a think tank for the administration, conducting strategic and inter-institutional studies, reviews, and research. It is responsible for introducing plans and proposals related to national strategies in political, economic, social, and cultural fields, in line with the general policies of the system.
This strategic deputy position was specifically created for Mohammad Javad Zarif, as it did not previously exist within the organizational structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Zarif's agenda
Zarif has clearly outlined the mission of this new deputy position: "No new bureaucracy or mechanisms will be created, there will be no burden on the government's budget or the people's table; no interference with existing operations; no diminishing the functions of any organization; and the role will serve as a bridge between the government, the people, think tanks, and civil institutions."
Zarif will not establish new organizations and will have an office within the presidential building. He will continue the role he played during Pezeshkian’s campaign and in the appointment of ministers: mobilizing and promoting Pezeshkian’s agenda. His job is to help the president navigate among existing power structures; a role similar to what he held as foreign minister. Additionally, in situations where the president is sidelined, Zarif will find ways to maneuver between political, security, and military forces, as he did when dealing with the notorious Qasem Soleimani, the IRGC, and the Supreme Leader’s office, to avoid becoming irrelevant.
The idea of connecting the government with the people and civil institutions seems far-fetched, as Zarif operates within the hardcore of power and has never engaged with independent civil society institutions in Iran.
Zarif's capabilities
Zarif lacks significant influence within the country, aside from a few experts at the Institute for Political and International Studies, an entity affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the senior staff of the Ministry. His real strength lies in the network he has cultivated abroad. During his decade-long stay in New York as Iran's representative at the United Nations and his 8 years as Foreign Minister, Zarif developed an extensive network of foreign contacts that Pezeshkian needs. Despite opposition from some in the parliament and the IRGC, Pezeshkian must bear the cost of maintaining Zarif's cooperation.
Zarif is a valuable partner for cooperation, often praised by a network of Iranian and non-Iranian forces in the media, think tanks, and foreign ministries in Western countries. He can shape narratives and provide analysis that aligns with the goals of Pezeshkian or the Leader’s office during critical periods. Holding a government position also shields him from suspicions of unauthorized cooperation with foreign governments, a serious legal charge in Iran. Over his eight years as Foreign Minister, Zarif demonstrated a high capacity for disinformation, outright lies, and propaganda aimed at influencing public opinion in the West.
An investigative report by Iran International and Semafor in 2023, revealed that during Zarif’s tenure as foreign minister, the Islamic Republic was able to create the Iran Experts Initiative in the United States in mid-2010s, to influence American policy centers and the US government. The operation was led and coordinated by officials working for Zarif.
A group of experts were tasked to write articles and opinion pieces, for example, that aimed to defend Tehran’s position on major issues, such as Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions.
In a recent example, after the killing of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31, individuals known for defending pro-Tehran positions in the West framed his assassination as a setback to the peace process and the pursuit of a ceasefire. This narrative, which aligns with the views of the Biden administration and some European countries, is used by the Islamic Republic of Iran to portray Israel as the aggressor. Zarif can focus on coordinating and amplifying these types of influence activities.