Iran International
A speech by Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei on Tuesday left many in and outside the country wondering whether negotiations with Washington are about to come to a screeching halt—but will they?
In his speech, Khamenei questioned the value of engaging with the United States and dismissed the enrichment red line set by the administration of President Donald Trump.
The Islamic Republic seeks no one’s permission, he said, adding that he doubted the negotiations would yield any results.
Such remarks have cast fresh uncertainty over a process already clouded by confusion over what has been discussed if such basic disagreements linger.
But has Khamenei really pulled the plug on diplomacy, or is he just shifting focus from one track to another?
Could there be multiple negotiation tracks?
Short answer: yes.
Under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–2013), Iran pursued diplomacy on multiple fronts. Ahmadinejad and one of his vice presidents held indirect talks via foreign intermediaries, while chief negotiator Saeed Jalili—officially representing Khamenei—led formal talks with European counterparts.
Meanwhile, foreign minister Ali Akbar Salehi, with Khamenei’s blessing, quietly opened a channel with the US in Oman. That secret track ultimately laid the groundwork for the 2015 nuclear deal.
Where is the second track now?
During President Trump’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia, Iran’s former national security chief Ali Shamkhani appeared on NBC, hinting at a proposal for compromise on uranium enrichment.
Trump reposted the message twice, signaling his approval, and remarked that negotiations appeared to be moving in the right direction.
The move appeared to have blindsided foreign minister Araghchi, whose spokesman insisted Shamkhani was not speaking for the official negotiating team.
Both Araghchi and his team criticized US officials—particularly Trump and lead negotiator Steve Witkoff—for spreading misleading information. But Shamkhani stood firm in remarks and editorials carried by Nour News, an outlet closely linked to him.
Shamkhani also holds an institutional advantage: he sits as Khamenei’s representative in the Supreme Council of National Security, to which Araghchi is required to report after every round of talks with the Americans.
How are the two tracks different?
The core difference appears to be over uranium enrichment. Araghchi’s team seeks a deal that guarantees a minimum level of enrichment. Shamkhani’s approach, in contrast, may be less focused on technical thresholds.
But both tracks would ultimately fall under Khamenei’s authority. Internal dissent against his direction remains unthinkable at the highest levels.
Khamenei’s remarks on Tuesday may be the first step in rolling back on the foreign ministry’s effort in favor of seeing what a channel led by Shamkhani might yield behind the scenes.
Why multiple tracks though?
The leadership in Tehran may be testing which channel best serves its strategic objectives. Khamenei has managed multiple negotiation channels before.
If other figures within the system see a diplomatic opening as a path to future influence—especially in a post-deal or post-Khamenei era—he may well authorize additional backchannels.
He may also be seeking to prolong the process, hoping that a future US president will take a more conciliatory approach. Whether Trump would be willing to wait that long remains to be seen.
